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On the Optimal Quantity of Public Goods and Related 
Issues 
 
Tamunopriye J. Agiobenebo, Ph.D. 
 
ABSTRACT  This  paper  seeks  to  reopen  a  discussion  that  the  profession  has 
considered settled and closed, namely, the issue of the optimal quantity of a public good to 
supply. Its focus is on the determination of the optimal quantity to supply of a public 
good  in  the  Pigovian  model  as  popularized  by  Musgrave.  It  argues  that  the  vertical 
summation of the individual demand curves in the Pigovian model is as inappropriate as the 
rejected horizontal summation of individuals’ consumption of public goods. The horizontal 
summation is inconsistent with the physical realities of public good supply suggesting an m-
multiple of the quantity that is actually available, which is an illusion. The vertical summation 
while  having  the  advantage  of  informing  on  efficiency  taxes  and  equitable  cost  sharing 
formula suffers from the fallacy of aggregation and exaggerates the aggregate demand for 
public goods, thus misleading supply decisions.  
  This realization comes from reckoning with the basic properties of pure public goods in 
particular nonrivalry – the joint supply property. Given this property, the paper submits that 
the optimal quantity of a public good is the largest quantity demanded by any single 
consumer  (individually  or  as  a  collective).  A  corollary  of  this  is  that  public  goods 
consumption is not validly subject to aggregation by any means. Aggregation is irrelevant 
and that individual demand curves or schedules are required only for the determination of 
optimal benefit  taxes and  equitable cost sharing  formula. That  is,  the  individual  demand 
curves  for  a  public  good  or  service  should  be  considered  only  for  the  purpose  of 
determining each person’s fair and equitable share of the cost of supply (i.e. based on 
the individuals’ marginal valuations)  as shown  in  Figure 4. In other  words,  the  so-called 
(collective) willingness to pay curve is only confusing issues and hence not required.  This in 
no way implies the consumption of separate quantities to be added up. Rather, it stages the 
consumption of the same quantity by all with different payments that are added up to finance 
the supply, which conforms to the Pigovian solution and indeed all the solutions that have 
been advanced. Yet, it is unique from the earlier solutions. 
  An equitable cost sharing formula that guarantees an efficient financing scheme is also 
proposed. It is a benefit share weighted cost sharing formula, which obviates the potential 
threat of fiscal drag. It is found that barring information failure, the public budget should 
ordinarily be enjoying surplus under optimal benefit taxes. That is with optimal benefit taxes, 
balanced budget is within easy reach with relief for taxpayers in relation to service benefits 
enjoyed and therefore, less resentment to taxation could be anticipated.  
  These  observations  and  findings  need  to  be  given  serious  thoughts.  Though,  the 
rationale for government intervention in an otherwise market economy is primarily seen in 
market failure, the ultimate justification is the gain in welfare from the achievement of Pareto 
improvements  in  resource  allocation.  It  follows  that  the  possibility  of  further  Pareto 
improvements in welfare must be a welcome development.   JEL: H41 
Key words: Optimal public good supply; Pigovian model; irrelevance of vertical summation; 
the fallacy of aggregation; efficient financing;  efficiency  taxes;  optimal benefit taxes;  and 
equitable cost sharing formula.   2
Introduction 
  Public goods are commodities that exhibit certain properties, namely, nonrivalry, non-
excludability, non-exhaustion and even indivisibility in consumption. These properties are not 
altogether mutually exclusive and the other three seem to contribute to nonrivalry. The focus 
of this paper, however, is the implications of nonrivalry as the key defining characteristic of a 
public good with optimal quantity in view. Nonrivalry means that the consumption of any user 
of a public good does not reduce the amount available for others. Thus, the non-rivalrous 
property does imply the non-exhaustion property subject only to crowding or congestion, 
which reduces the quality of what is available to all. Buchanan (1968) seems to suggest that 
distance  from  facility  locations  can  also  cause  variations  in  quality.  Quality  variations, 
however, would be reflected in the marginal valuations of the users. Crowding or congestion, 
in any case, could be controlled in principle.  
  It is important to recognize that non-rivalrous consumption implies that making a public 
good  available  to  any  one  single  individual  makes  it  possible  to  provide  it  for  everyone 
without additional cost. This is the joint supply property.  Thus, joint consumption means that 
public goods are used simultaneously by all consumers without individual exclusion. It is for 
this reason that public goods are also called “collective goods” and even “non-exchange 
goods”.  It  follows  that  the  additional  cost  of  providing  an  existing  public  good  for  an 
additional  user  is  zero.  This  is  clearly  exemplified  by  Buchanan’s  example  of  mosquito 
repelling by Tizio and Caio, which exhibits the property of zero additional cost. Further, it 
clearly reveals the waste in the competitive supply of mosquito repelling by Tizio and Caio. 
As he rightly noted, the death of one mosquito benefits each man simultaneously. So, once 
the mosquitoes are  dead any number of migrants can join the community  and enjoy  its 
peace and health without additional cost. After all, no mosquitoes die twice or do they? 
   This should not be confused with providing two, three or any number of a public facility 
be it a baseball or football stadium or highway, which involve space and or time dimensions 
and quite different considerations. Building any number of a public facility is perhaps best 
analyzed within a multi-plant paradigm than within the context of marginal adjustment. The   3
focus here, however, is on what it costs to admit a new user for an existing facility? This 
motivates a number of questions. What is the equilibrium condition of the new user?
1 Or is 
this entry irrelevant to the optimal solution? If it is relevant then, what is the optimal quantity 
of a public good to supply? Further, what is the efficient means for financing the provision? 
In  addition,  what  is  the  equitable  cost  sharing  formula?  These  questions  are  intimately 
related. And they have attracted the attention of some of the best minds and known names 
in the profession. Attempts to answer the question on the optimal quantity to supply have 
faced  a  major  challenge  i.e.  the  challenge  of  discovering  a  costless  means  of  truthful 
preference  revelation,  aggregation  and  interpretation.  It  led  to  economics  incursions  into 
political analysis. Many, if not all, of the economic theories of politics, directly or indirectly 
speak to these issues.  
  Wicksell among others had the insight that political institutions and procedures might be 
useful  means  of  preference  revelation  and  for  the  aggregation  of  preferences,  he 
recommended unanimity. Unanimity is costlessly obtainable in a homogeneous population or 
society. Wicksell is right that if public choices can be made by unanimity, they will both be 
efficient and equitable. Most unfortunately, homogeneous societies or populations hardly, if 
ever, exist. Conceivably, unanimity could also be obtained if the benefits and burdens of 
public choices, decisions and actions are distributed in such a manner as to equate marginal 
benefits (valuation) to marginal costs (taxes) for each and every member of society. This 
condition decried by its logistic requirements is most unlikely sounding. Under conditions of 
heterogeneity, preference diversity escalates in the powers of
m 2 , where m is the number of 
individuals or homogeneous subgroups in the society. The result is multiple suggestions and 
the “best” for society becomes controversial. Since all the conditions that favour unanimity 
are easily violated in the real world, political practice conveniently settles for some majority 
voting rules, which unfortunately are known not to produce transitive public choices. This is 
the paradox of majority rule in the literature. The pertinent question, therefore, is what are 
                                                       
1 It is recognized that in time or eventually crowding will lead to expansion but this is a scale problem rather than 
a marginal adjustment.   4
the alternatives for optimal public decision-making? 
  Many  suggestions  litter  the  field  and  there  is  no  unique  solution.  As  for  truthful 
preference  revelation,  there  seem  to  be  no  better  alternative  to  the  political  process  as 
imperfect  as  it  is,  though  economists  may  suggest  survey  approach.  For  preference 
aggregation, economists have suggested the cardinal utility approach, which is conceptually 
elegant but not a practicable proposition founded on an unobservable quantity – marginal 
utility.  Others  include  Pareto  superiority,  Pareto  improvement  and  Pareto  optimality  that 
exhibit varying degrees of practicality and the economic surplus technique with reasonable 
degree of practicality though with a lot of limitations. On the equity axis, the sacrifice rules 
and  compensation  principles  have  been  advanced  with  little  or  no  possibility  of  rational 
implementation. Admittedly, the compensation principle is actually being practised but with a 
lot of imperfections. Consequently, many questions remain open. 
The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Optimal Supply Public Goods 
The Demand for Public Goods 
  Given the property of joint consumption, consumers need not reveal their true demand 
for public goods in a marketplace. This means that there are no demand curves for public 
goods. This  is well  known  to the  profession.  Yet,  it is the submission of  this  paper that 
contrary  to  the  conventional  wisdom,  this  difficulty  does  not  pose  any  problems  for  the 
determination of the optimal quantity of a public good. Even when, society is made up of 
honest citizens, the vertical aggregation of the true demands of the consumers does not 
reveal the optimal quantity but overestimates it. This is the basic thesis of this paper. 
The Pigovian Approach 
  Pigou (1928) provided an analysis of the efficient allocation of resources to public and 
private goods. He used the utilitarian approach assuming cardinal utility for which he was 
criticized severely. Yet, the profession is grateful for the insights he provided on many of the 
pertinent  questions.  Private  commodities  are  divisible  and  are  provided  with  individual 
exclusion. Divisibility and exclusion imply rival consumption and exhaustion. Thus, for private   5
goods, qpi is not necessarily equal to qpj, i ¹ j; qpi £ Qps (where Qps is the total supply of the 
private good) such that ￿
m
1 qpi (aggregate consumption) 
= < Qps. The strict equality is the 
market clearing condition and the interpretation of the exhaustion property, while ￿
m
1 qpi is 
the definition of horizontal summation of individual demands. Given these characteristics, the 
demand  for  private  goods  gets  expressed  in  the  marketplace  and  is  satisfied  by  profit-
seeking entrepreneurs.  
  It is quite different for public goods. Given joint consumption, consumers can free ride, 
get dishonest and falsify their preferences, since they could be consumed without paying for 
them. Thus, for public goods, we have  
qsi = qsj, i ¹ j; i.e. qs1 = qs2 = qs3 = … = qsm = Qss (total supply of the public good).  
 
Hence, total consumption of public goods by horizontal summation leads to  
￿
m
1 qpi = mQs = Qs, m ³ 1.  
 
If the strict inequality holds, then, the horizontal aggregation is inconsistent with reality. It 
actually becomes an illusion. For this reason, it is rejected. This aggregation problem arise 
from the fact that a unit of public goods once supplied provides a multiplicity of consumption 
units, all of which are somehow identical, which is the meaning of (m > 1).
2 Consequently, it 
will  not  be  efficient  to  exclude  any  one  from  its  consumption.  The  foregoing  discussion 
shows that the analysis of the efficient allocation of resources to public goods supply must 
proceed under restrictive assumptions and pseudo demand curves. This has been the case. 
Despite,  its  obvious  deficiencies,  the  voluntary  exchange  approach  is  instructive  for  the 
insights it provides on many of the pertinent questions the theory of public goods supply has 
to answer.  
  For purposes of geometrical illustration, let m = 2. That is, the analysis assumes a two-
person economy that produces and consumes private and public goods from here on. Figure 
1 sets out the usual analysis of a private good (a la Musgrave 1958, 1989). The curves DpA 
                                                       
2 See Buchanan (1968), The Demand and Supply of Public Goods: Chapter 4. 
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and DpA denote the demand curves for individual A and B, respectively for the private good. 
The  differences  in  the  demand  curves  are  presumed  to  reflect  the  differences  in  the 
socioeconomic circumstances and tastes of the consumers. The market demand curve DpA+B 
is derived by horizontal summation of the individual demand curves, i.e. DpA+B = (DpA + DpB). 
Any point on the individual demand curves has the usual interpretation, i.e. the marginal 
valuation of the usefulness of the commodity at a given price to the consumer and hence a 
willingness to consume or pay for consumption by the consumer (ceteris paribus).  
The market demand curve shows how much all individuals are willing to consume at the 
schedule of prices. Given the supply curve S, which is the schedule of marginal costs for 
supplying each quantity of output, the market forces of demand and supply determine the 
market  clearing  (equilibrium)  price,  Pp*  in  Figure  1  with  the  corresponding  equilibrium 
quantity Qp* = OQa + OQB. 











  Figure 1 shows that commodity Qp is divisible and individuals A and B given their socio-
economic circumstances and preferences purchased different quantities,  which equalized 
their marginal utilities from consuming the commodity in equilibrium at the same price. The 
divisibility, rival consumption, exhaustion and adding-up properties of the private good are all 
manifest in the diagram.  
  Figure  2  sets  out  a  similar  analysis  for  the  public  good.  But,  there  are  significant 
differences. Figure 2 assumes truthful revelation of consumers’ preferences for the public 
 
Figure 1: Analysis of the Optimal Supply of Private Good 
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good, so that the conventional demand curves can be used for the analysis. Samuelson 
(1954) refers to DsA and DsB as pseudo demand curves because the assumption of truthful 
revelation  of  consumer  preferences,  strictly  speaking  is  a  highly  restrictive  one  in  this 
context.  The  vertical  summation  of  individual  demand  curves  yields  DsA+B,  the  market 
demand curve for the public good, which is sometimes called the collective willingness to 
pay  curve.  The  intersection  of  this  curve  with  the  supply  curve  defines  the  equilibrium 
quantity, Qss* in Pigou-Musgrave model as illustrated in Figure 2, which is in excess of the 












  Figure 2 reveals interesting things about the preferences of individuals A and B, which 
are distorted by the indivisibility property of the public good, Qs and their attitudes to this 
situation.
3  It shows that if Qs were divisible as the private good in Figure 1, individual A 
would have purchased no more than qsA for which it is willing to pay PsA per unit. Similarly, B 
would have demanded no more than qsB for which it is willing to pay PsB per unit. The market 
demand  for  Qs  therefore  would  have  been  qsA  +  qsB  for  which  A  and  B  would  have 
                                                       
3 Surprisingly, the concept of indivisibility as used here seemed to have caused confusion. It shouldn’t. In Figure 
1, the divisibility of the private commodity in consumption allowed individuals A and B to buy the quantities each 














Figure 2: Analysis of the Optimal Supply of Public Good 
Ss 
The Collective 
Willingness to pay Curve 
i*   8
collectively contributed PsAqsA + PsBqsB.  This would have been the case if Qs were divisible in 
consumption and could be provided with individual exclusion. Unfortunately, this is not the 
case.  Since  Qs  is  not  divisible  in  consumption,  individuals  A  and  B  are  both  forced  to 
consume  the  entire  quantity  supplied
4,  namely  QsA+B  =  Qss*,  which  is  in  excess  of  their 
respective  demands.  The  larger  quantity  lowered  the  marginal  utilities  derived  by  each 
consumer  for  which  they  are  both  unwilling  to  pay  PsA  and  PsB,  respectively.  In  the 
circumstances A is willing to contribute only  A t < PsA and B is willing to pay  B t < PsB. Figure 
2 defines vertical summation as the adding-up mechanism for unit contributions made by all 
consumers for the total quantity of the public good supplied, namely Qss*. 
  Another consequence of the indivisibility of the public good that is quite visible in Figure 
2  is  that,  given  the  differences  in  their  preferences,  individuals A  and  B  derive  different 
marginal utilities for the same quantity of the public good even in equilibrium unlike the case 
with the private good. For this reason, they are also unwilling to pay the same price (in 
taxes) for the same quantity of the public good. Further, it is the sum of the individual prices 
paid by A and B that equal the marginal cost of production, i.e. ( A t + B t ) = 
*
s t  = MC, which 
is the Samuelson condition for equilibrium or optimal supply of public goods. This rule says 
that  the  efficiency  condition  for  the  optimal  supply  of  a  public  good  is  the  sum  of  the 
individual prices (marginal benefits or utilities) equals marginal cost. But, the diagram also 
reveals  that  the  equilibrium for  public  goods  is  layered.  Indeed,  the  precondition  for  the 
market equilibrium is equilibrium of each and every consumer, which adds up to the market 
equilibrium. It is this condition that instructs the charging of benefit taxes, i.e. MBi =  i t  in 
equilibrium.  Further,  it  is  only  by  this  principle  that  are  individual  equilibrium  positions 
consistent with the market equilibrium and conversely.  
                                                       
4 It is not always the case that individual’s consumption of public goods will always equal total supply, since 
consumption  is  subject  to  need,  the  capacity  to  consume  and  greed.  So,  an  individual  can  abstain  from 
consumption. Thus, equal availability does not necessarily imply equal consumption. Buchanan’s example of fire 
station is also relevant here and implies variability in quality. But variability in quality and/or quantity does not 
really pose any serious problems for the theory or the analytics because the marginal valuations reflect these.  
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The Bowen and Samuelson’s Models 
  These analyses are addressed to general equilibrium models of optimal inter-sectoral 
allocation of resources to private and public goods production. Their presentation did not 
utilize  the  vertical  summation  device  for  aggregating  demand  for  public  goods. 
Consequently, these models are not relevant to the focus of this discourse and so are not 
discussed further in this paper. According to Brown and Jackson (1990), Samuelson’s model 
is a neoclassical generalization of the earlier models of Wicksell and Lindahl and it is these 
models that are of direct relevance to the focus of this paper. 
Wicksell-Lindahl Approach to Public Goods Supply 
  This  model  of  analysis  unlike  the  Pigovian  model,  which  emphasized  the  joint 
consumption  property,  emphasized  the  non-excludability  property.  However,  since  non-
excludability leads to joint consumption, both properties can be presumed accounted for in 
this model. But, the model is not founded on the vertical aggregation premise. Their analysis 
is acutely aware that non-excludability means that A would see B’s demand as its supply. 
Likewise B would consider A’s provision as its supply. Therefore, it is improper to aggregate 
A’s and B’s demands by whatever means. Accordingly the analysis did not aggregate the 
demand  curves  of  A  and  B  vertically  or  otherwise.  Given  the  assumption  of  truthful 
preference revelation, their focus was on cooperative production of the public good that will 
achieve  equalized  marginal  utilities  at  the  same  price  in  equilibrium  as  is  the  case  with 
private goods. 
  Figure  3  provides  a  geometric  interpretation  of  their model.  Costs,  cost shares  and 
marginal valuations and hence prices are measured on the vertical axis while quantities of 
the public good are measured along the horizontal axis. OA is the origin of individual A. 
Similarly, OB is the origin of individual B. The AA curve is the demand curve of A, which B 
sees as its supply curve. Similarly, the BB curve is the demand curve of B, which A sees as 
its supply curve. The point of intersection E, equalizes the marginal valuations (marginal 
utilities) of A and B. Consequently, they are both willing to pay the same price,  * t  and   10
consume the same quantity, G* of the public good. That is, the total contribution of A and B 
toward the supply of G* is ( * t  +  * t ) = 2 * t . It follows that the Wicksell-Lindahl solution 
recommends a poll or head tax  as the financing mechanism. Thus, the Wicksell-Lindahl 
model is only a special case. Points off E are disequilibrium situations in which A and B insist 
on different quantities for which they are only willing to pay different prices as exemplified by 
GA and GB. Thus, for points off E, the outcome is a priori indeterminate. The point ( * t , G*) is 














  Some writers for example Brown and Jackson (1990) regard the Lindahl equilibrium as 
Nash (competitive) equilibrium. It is not. It is a cooperative equilibrium. How else can the 
intersection of the two demand curves in equilibrium be interpreted? The intersection of the 
demand curves of A and B signifies that the choices of these individuals are coordinated into 
agreement. It is for this reason that E is an equilibrium position. The important point for the 
purposes of this paper, however, is that the optimal quantity in this model is not derived from 
a vertical aggregation of the individual demands, even though the individual demand curves 
are explicitly considered. Neither is it necessary to add up the individual demands vertically 
nor is this sufficient for the determination of the optimal level of a public good. 
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Figure 3: Wicksell-Lindahl Model of Optimal Public Good Supply   11
defining the efficient and equitable cost sharing formula, it exaggerates the optimal demand 
for  a  pure  public  good.  Given  that  pure  public  goods  are  non-rival  in  consumption.  For 
instance,  in  Figure  2,  individual  B’s  demand  (provision)  over  satisfies  the  demand  by 
individual A, i.e. qsB > qsA. So, individual A can comfortably share in what individual B has 
provided.  Consequently,  there  is  no  need  to  add  A’s  demand  to  that  of  B  in  order  to 
determine the optimal quantity. The optimum quantity demanded of it is simply the quantity 
demanded by individual B, which is qsB and not Qss* as the Pigovian model in Musgrave’s 
framework suggests. Thus, the conceptualization and definition of the aggregate demand for 
public goods in the Pigovian model followed by R. A. Musgrave as illustrated in Figure 2 is 
not correct. So, for purposes of planning, it is not the aggregate of the individual demands 
summed vertically that is relevant but the greatest quantity demanded by a single consumer 
of a public good.  
  Some examples can clarify the idea and the arguments in its support. Consider the 
provision  of  an  effective  national  defence,  it  is  for  national  honour,  but,  it  protects  all 
residents from foreign conquests. The quantity provided is not arrived at by adding vertically 
or  otherwise  of  the  individual  resident’s  demand  for  defence.  Consider  electronic 
broadcasting, it is simply sent through the airwaves and all those within the coverage area, 
who  care  to  tune  in,  receive  the  messages.  Take  the  highway  connecting  Gaborone  to 
Francistown (i.e. any two cities anywhere). The length of this highway is determined by the 
demand for road by people in Francistown to travel from Francistown to Gaborone and back. 
Once this highway is constructed all the communities in-between these two towns can freely 
commute  to  and  from  each  of  these  cities  without  requiring  their  own  individual  roads. 
Consider flood control, if the largest demand is a 10-feet high dam or water-brake, once this 
is constructed, then, all those in the area requiring 9.999-feet to zero inches of dam or water-
brake are automatically provided for. This is the point. Whatever quantity that is provided of 
a public good would be used by all those who demand it under non-rivalrous consumption. 
So why aggregate individual demands? The Lindahl’s model seems to have this point of 
view, even if implicitly. Contrast this to a situation in which ten persons are demanding 1, 2,   12
3, …, 10 feet of dam, if these demands are added up vertically to determine the optimal 
quantity of dam (water brake) required, then, the government would build a 55-feet dam, 45 
feet of which is a waste.  
  Indeed, this concept of waste is quite obvious in the Buchanan’s model of independent 
adjustment (see Chapter 2) of Tizio’s and Caio’s supply of mosquito repelling service, which 
motivates and orders the adjustments in the trading model, i.e. the existence of unexploited 
mutual gains in the supply of the public good. This, however, does not lead to a larger outlay 
on the provision of the public good as he argued. After all, the public service is already in 
excess supply in the competitive equilibrium of Tizio and Caio because of the unconscious 
addition of their individual demands. Rather the outcome is a curtailment of the waste in the 
competitive supply leading to a saving in resources that made possible an increase in the 
supply of the private good. It has to be realized that the joint income or endowment of Tizio 
and Caio is fixed and the rise in their real income is from gain in allocative efficiency rather 
than increase in resources. The waste under reference arises from implicit aggregation of 
their  separate  needs  for  mosquito  repelling  service,  which  led  to  wasteful  duplication  of 









  Figure  4  demonstrates  the  implications  of  the  viewpoint  of  this  paper.  In  Figure  4 
individual A still demands qsA and is willing to pay PsA per unit for it as in Figure 2 and would 
be  in  equilibrium  at  EsA,  if  the  public  good  were  divisible  in  consumption  and  could  be 
provided with exclusion. However, individual B demands qsB > qsA and is willing to contribute 
EsAk 
 Figure 4: On the Maximum Quantity of Public Goods 
Demanded, Individual and Market Equilibrium 
 
QsB = Qs* 
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PsA   13
the cost of providing this quantity, i.e. an amount that will cover the total cost under truthful 
preference revelation. Thus, individual A can safely play the free rider without adversely 
affecting the supply. Individual B is in equilibrium at EsB, which is also the market equilibrium 
(EsM). Given individual A’s preferences and qsB, if it pays no more than k per unit, individual 
A is also at equilibrium at both EsAk and EsM simultaneously. Under the assumption of truthful 
preference revelation, individual A is honest about its attitude to the public good. It admits 
that the public good in question is useful to it but the larger quantity that it is being forced to 
consume has reduced its marginal valuation to k < PsA, which it is willing to pay per unit. This 
result  is  consistent  with  Henderson  and  Quandt  (1980:  300-2)  example  of  the  Lindahl 
equilibrium  and  actually  generalizes  the  Lindahl’s  solution,  since  in  that  model  the  cost 
shares for the public good provision are not necessarily equal. Indeed, in the two-consumer 
model that Henderson and Quandt (1980) used to represent the Lindahl model, the cost 
shares were a = 
27
4
 and (1-a) = 
27
23
, which lends credence to our conclusion that the 
Wicksell-Lindahl equilibrium in Figure 3 is a special case. 
Efficient Financing Scheme and Equitable Cost-Sharing Formula 
  It is clear in Figure 4 that under truthful preference revelation and benefit taxes, public 
goods would generate budget surpluses, since  
(PB + k)QsB > PsBQsB (the total cost of providing QsB) for k > 0.  
 
The area of the rectangle kEsAkQsBO measures the potential budget surplus, which is 
 (PB + k)QsB - PsBQsB = kQsB, k > 0.  
 
This says a lot on the fiscal practices that have generated budget deficits the world over in a 
cumulative manner. An important issue to consider is a higher order implication of benefit 
taxes, namely, the budget surplus with its potential for fiscal drag on the economy. The 
model is silent over how this possibility can be handled and also how the cost would be 
shared efficiently and equitably. These questions, however, can be answered perfectly. The 
cue lies in the benefit tax principle. The efficient and equitable cost sharing principle in this   14
situation results in a benefit share weighted cost sharing formula. This formula also takes 
care of the budget surplus and hence the threat of fiscal drag. It says that individuals A and 
B should pay 
C
P sB) ( + k
k





) ( + k
,      
 
respectively given that under truthful preference revelation, the individual demand curves 
represent  perfect  marginal  valuations  of  the  public  good  such  that  k  and  PsB  represent 
marginal benefits (utilities) to the users – individuals A and B, respectively. That is, the share 
of the individual in the total benefit determines the proportion of the total cost the individual 
should contribute or pay toward its provision. Notice that  
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which  proves  that  the  total  cost  will  be  covered  by  this  formula.  When  equation  (1)  is 
compared to Henderson and Quandt (1980) solution to the Lindahl’s model, we can decipher 
the following analogies, i.e. 
) ( sB P + k
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 = (1-a). 
  This result is quite different from the Lindahl’s solution, which equalizes the marginal 
benefits  in  equilibrium  and  hence  the  individual  contributions  and  implicitly  or  otherwise 
recommends a poll or head tax. So, it is only a special case of the model espoused in the 
paper, which can be generalized to cover wide spectrum of cost shares. Given that k and PsB 
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derived by all the consumers of the public good and tI is benefit share of individual i, which is 
its unit tax in decimal units with C (the total cost of the public good) as base. This formula,   15
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is  the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  individual  consumers  while  the  condition  for  market 










t  = C, StI; = 1.  
 
  The model espoused in this paper as illustrated in Figure 4 has a lot of potential for 
improvements in resource allocation. Comparing the results of this model with those of the 
vertical summation (Pigovian) model as illustrated in Figure 2, we find that (QsA+B – qsB) 
measures the excess supply over and above the desirable optimal supply. Eliminating this 
excess would save resources for other purposes, which could expand both the production 
and  consumption  possibility  frontiers  of  the  economy.  The  tax  burden  is  less  than  the 
benefits, yet the tax contributions cover total cost. So, there would be no budget deficits or 
surpluses to worry about. Furthermore, because the tax burden is less than the benefits, 
taxes would be less resentful to pay. For example, even when B is willing to pay for the 
entire cost, the willingness of A to share in the cost brings B relief and consumer surplus 
and/or a budget surplus to the state. It follows that tax evasion and avoidance would be 
minimized by this benefit weighted cost sharing formula. As far as this model of analysis is 
concerned,  the  optimal  quantity  of  a  public  good  to  supply  is  no  longer  a  mystery  to 
providers, the political process and/or the survey approach can easily reveal it.  
Efficient Financing Scheme and Equitable Cost-Sharing Formula 
  Further comments on the conventional analysis of the optimal supply of public goods 
are in order. At this juncture the paper is persuaded to invite the profession to give thought 
reflections on a number of questions that are supposedly closed. For instance, what do we 
really consider as the marginal cost of a pure public good? Given that it is not possible to 
produce one half or any fraction thereof (say of a stadium or a bridge) though any number of   16
stadia or bridges can be constructed in principle, what constitutes the marginal cost of a 
given stadium or bridge? Is the construction of a network of stadia in space and time not 
belong more  in  a multi-plant paradigm with  implicit implication of the concept  of  optimal 
population than within marginal analysis? The Samuelson’s condition for the determination 
of the optimal quantity is 
S
m
1 MBi = MC. 
 
  What is the interpretation of this condition in the light of the above questions and the 
fact that the additional user could use a public good without additional cost? It is tempting to 
suggest for a road project, (say a highway joining Washington, D. C. and New York), that 
MC can be computed for the next kilometer of the road. But, a little contemplation shows that 
this corresponds more to average than marginal cost. At any rate, a kilometer of a road is 
only a fraction of the road and since a fragment cannot be the whole, a fragment of a product 
cannot be the product and so cannot be the basis for computing MC. How does the concept 
of the marginal cost of producing a public good compare with that of producing a box of 
matches or a packet of biscuits or a deep freezer or a DVD set? What is it and how should it 
seen? 
  It has been said that the indivisibility of public goods in production says nothing about 
the details of the cost function? But, what  is the cost function? Is  it  not  the  dual of  the 
production function?
5 Or is this a misinformation to students by the profession? The above 
questions  suggest  that  the  marginal  cost  of  a  pure  public  good  is  zero.  Therefore,  the 
Samuelson condition reduces to  
  S
m
1 MBi = MC = 0. 
  It follows that this optimal condition is actually a recommendation for the debasement of 
scarce resources. It also means that the marginal cost curve for the supply of public goods 
does  not  exist  just  as  the  demand  curve  for  public  goods.  It  is  intriguing  that  Figure  3 
determined the optimal quantity without reference to marginal cost or supply curve. So, the 
                                                       
5 See Varian (1978, 1980) Microeconomic Analysis.   17
Pigovian analysis and all other analyses of public goods supply based on the marginal cost 
curve crumbles completely. Some writers for example McConnell and Brue (1998) even talk 
about the last unit of the public good. A fundamental question is whether or not such a 
quantity  exists?  After  all,  the  indivisibility  property  of  public  goods  is  even  stronger  in 
production than in consumption, at least for some public goods. Thus, the supply curve for a 
public good is the average cost curve, which is upward sloping for the well known reasons, 
though, it could be horizontal or even downward sloping but would never vanish. Therefore, 
the suggested general optimal condition for public goods supply is 
S
m
1 MBi = AC. 
 
  For  some  people,  this  condition  might  raise  questions  about  or  issues  of  Pareto 
optimality  from  the  perspective  of  the  orthodox  definition.  Such  questions,  however,  are 
misconceived and misplaced because they fail to appreciate that equilibrium or the optimum 
is relative to the reality of situations. This in no way debates that Pareto optimal solutions are 
the  first  bests.  But,  a  pertinent  question  is  whether  Pareto  optimal  solutions  are  always 
feasible? If the answer to this question is in the negative, then second best solutions are not 
trivial. Of course, the Samuelson condition holds and is appropriate, if a given public good 
has a well defined and continuous marginal cost function. 






  What seems to be stirring us in the face is a fixed supply scenario. A 100,000-seater 
capacity stadium or a four-lane bridge specified to carry set load is fixed in supply. It is of 
course understood that in time facilities can be expanded. But, this sounds more of scale 






A ￿  
Figure 5: A Model of Fixed Public Goods Supply 
B ￿    18
appropriate analytical framework is that illustrated in Figure 5. This vertical supply curve 
shifts outward to the right when facilities are expanded and to the left if facilities are left to rot 
and decay. This model thus seems to describe reality much more closely than marginal 
analysis. It is intriguing that the results in Figure 5 conform and further strengthen the results 
obtained in Figure 4. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  This  paper  revisited  the  analysis  of  optimal  public  goods  supply.  It  argues  that  the 
vertical summation of individual demands for a public good as in the Pigovian model as sold 
by Musgrave is an improper framework for the determination of the optimal quantity of a 
public good to supply. Specifically, this method is accused of overestimating the desirable 
optimal quantity of a public good. The paper submits that the optimal quantity for a public 
good  is  the  largest  quantity  demanded  by  any  single  consumer  (individually  or  as  a 
collective) per unit time. A corollary of this is that public goods consumption is not validly 
subject  to  aggregation  by  any  methods  including  vertical  summation.  Aggregation  is 
irrelevant  and  that  the  individual  demand  curves  or  schedules  are  required  only  for  the 
determination  of  optimal  benefit  taxes  and  equitable  cost  sharing formula.  That  is,  each 
person’s consumption or utilization of the good or service must be considered separately 
only for the purpose of determining each person’s fair and equitable share of the cost of 
supply  based  on  its  marginal  benefit.  So,  the  paper  recommends  the  use  of  the  model 
illustrated  in  Figure  4  instead  of  the  Pigou-Musgrave model  as  illustrated  in  Figure  2.  It 
further thinks that Figure 5 provides a more realistic analytical framework for the supply of 
public goods than any other voluntary exchange model.  
  It  is  found  that  barring  information  failure,  the  public  budget  should  ordinarily  be 
enjoying  surplus  under optimal  benefit  taxes. Otherwise,  balanced  budget  is  within  easy 
reach with relief for taxpayers in relation to benefits enjoyed. Therefore, less resentment to 
taxation  could  be  anticipated.  An  efficient  financing  scheme  and  equitable  cost  sharing 
formula is also proposed. It is a benefit share weighted cost sharing formula, namely SaiPs =   19
Ps, where SaI = 1; Ps = the price of the public good and ai is the benefit share of individual i 
as defined in equation (1).  
  Reckoning with the nature of public goods, the paper notes that the marginal cost of 
providing public goods to additional users is zero. It also believes that marginal cost curves 
for public goods do not exist in the orthodox sense. So, marginal analyses are inappropriate 
for the supply of public goods. This means that all analyses of optimal public goods supply 
based on the marginal cost curve are null and void. Interpreting the Samuelson’s condition 
for optimal public good supply in this light, the paper concludes that it is a recommendation 
for the debasement of scarce resources, which does not make any good economic sense. In 
its place, the paper recommended the equality of the sum of marginal benefits (utilities) to 
the average cost of production as the condition for the optimal supply of public goods. It also 
concluded that the relevant supply curve for public goods is the average cost curve, yet, it 
believes that the supply curve of many a public good such as roads and bridges is more of a 
vertical line denoting fixed supply than anything else. 
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